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ABSTRACT
Directors and officers liability (hereinafter D&O) serves as a deterrent
to corporate wrongdoing. Recent cycles of corporate scandal have
impacted the tools used to manage the risk that D&O liability creates.
The impact of these scandals is a "shock," which is a sudden event that
alters the market profoundly. Market alteration has counter intuitively
resulted in increased availability of D&O insurance at a lower price,
despite an increase in D&O liability. With increased D&O coverage
offerings at lower costs, the market has become soft, making coverage
readily available. Carriers are competing for insureds and there is now a
risk of undermining the deterrent effect that D&O liability provides. This
paper explores whether D&O liability's deterrent effect has been
jeopardized in this soft D&O insurance market.
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THE SHOCKING IMPACT OF CORPORATE SCANDAL ON
DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY
NANCY R. MANSFIELD, JOAN T. A. GABEL, KATHLEEN A.
MCCULLOUGH, STEPHEN G. FIER
"Truth makes many appeals, not the least of which is its
power to shock." - Jules Renard'
INTRODUCTION
Directors and officers liability (hereinafter D&O) serves as a deterrent
to corporate wrongdoing2 and D&O insurance emerged to manage the
risk of this liability.3 Recent cycles of corporate scandal, however, have
impacted the liability and insurance tools used to manage the risk that
D&O liability creates. This impact, within the Risk Management
literature, is considered a "shock"4 that alters the normal market for D&O
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1 EvAN EsAR, 20,000 QuipS & QuOTES: A TREASURY OF WiTY REMARKS, COMIc
PROVERBS, WISECRACKS, AND EPIGRAMYS (Barnes & Noble Books 1995) (1968).
2 Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors'
& Oficers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 488-89 (2007) ("The primary goal of
liability rules in corporate and securities law, it is often said, is to deter corporate officers and directors
from engaging in conduct harmful to their shareholders. Yet it is typically a third-party insurer that
satisfies these liabilities under the terms of the corporation's D&O policy. The deterrence goals of
corporate and securities liability are thus achieved indirectly, through an insurance intermediary, if
indeed they are achieved at all." (citations omitted)).
3 See id. at 487.
Shock is defined as "[a] profound and sudden disturbance of the physical or mental senses; a
sudden and violent physical or mental impression depressing the body's vital forces, as by a sudden injury or
medical procedure." Black's Law Dictionary 1504 (9th ed. 2009).
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insurance profoundly and unexpectedly.5  One might expect a shock to
reduce the supply of coverage (as it had in the early 2000s), but this
market alteration has counterintuitively resulted in increased availability
of D&O insurance coverage at a lower price following the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereinafter "SOX"), even with the increased
uncertainty in the late 2000s associated with corporate governance. With
increased D&O coverage offerings at lower costs, the market has become
"soft,"6 making coverage readily available. Carriers now are competing for
insureds and offering high coverage at a low price to such an extent that
there is now a risk of undermining the deterrent effect that D&O liability
provides.7
This paper explores whether D&O liability's deterrent effect has been
jeopardized by this soft D&O insurance market. In Part I, we describe the
parameters of D&O liability and its deterrent effect. In Part II, we
evaluate the risk management tools, namely D&O insurance, that have
emerged in response to D&O liability and explore how those tools have
evolved to support the goal of deterrence. In Part III, we discuss how
recent scandals have "shocked" the market for D&O liability risk
management options. In Part IV, we conclude by analyzing whether the
impact of these shocks and the resulting soft market has undermined the
deterrent effect of D&O liability.
I. D&O LIABILITY AND ITS DETERRENT EFFECT
"[T]he primary goal of liability rules in corporate and securities
law. . . is to deter corporate officers and directors from engaging in
conduct harmful to shareholders."' D&O liability is an offshoot of
s See Stephen Fier, Kathleen McCullough, Nancy R Mansfield & Joan, T. A Gabel, The Dircors
and Oicers Insurance Marketplace: An Etnpirical Examination of Supply and Demand in Uncertain Times (Dec. 15,
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), available at http//ssrncom/abstract= 1524063
(examining the impacts of the "loss shocks" created by the corporate scandals of the early 2000's and the
implementation of the Sarbanes-Odey Act to evaluate "probability updating theory," which holds that after
such "loss shocks" decision makers' perceptions of fiture losses shift, resulting in a change in price or the
availabihty ofcoverage). See also discussion infra note 76.
6 In a soft market, insurers loosen underwriting standards and profits typically decline.
Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 507. Further, D&O insurers are typically less selective when
determining whether to issue a D&O liability policy and often give discounts. Id. at 508.
7 See Tower Perrin, Directors and Oficers Liability: 2008 Survey of Insurance Purchasing Trends 42
(TowersWatson 2009), http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/2791/2791.pdf (last visited May 14,
2012); see also discussion infra pp. 25-30.
See discussion infra Part I.
9 Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 487 n.2; Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell,
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common law agency theory that holds "a principal is subject to a duty to
indemnify an agent for damages the agent is required to pay to a third
person . . . ."o D&O liability leverages this agency principle in two
contexts: (1) claims by shareholders that directors and officers have
breached their duties to the corporation and (2) federal securities law
claims via shareholder derivative suits." Shareholder derivative suits serve
as the primary deterrent mechanism to prevent wrongful conduct and
ensure directors and officers uphold their fiduciary duties. 2 In either case,
directors and officers bear personal liability." By placing personal liability
on directors and officers for their actions (or inactions), the burden of
corporate loss shifts, from shareholders to the decision makers.14 Thus,
liability "raise(s) the expected cost of the undesirable behavior" by the
directors and officers and the potential for personal liability for their
When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1738 (1994).
10 Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and
Oficers, 33 Bus. LAw. 1993, 1994 (1978).
" Joshua Dobiac, I Came, I Saw, I Underwrote: DSO Liability Insurance's Past Undenriting Practices and
Potential Future Dirtions, 14 CONN. INs. L.J. 487,490 (2008). D&O liability may arise in other circumstances.
For example, directors and officers may also be liable for corporate debts under the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil. The following is a non-exclusive list of potential devices used to pierce the corporate veil: the
alter ego theory, a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, tort claims, criminal charges, actions taken after
dissolution, director liability under the Business Corporation Act of 1983, evidence of kickbacks and bribes,
failure to pay wages, failure to pay taxes, refusal to allow shareholders to review corporate records, and
violation of other statutes such as the Franchise Disclosure Act. David M. Madden, The Limits of Limited
Liabiityfor Corporate Officrs, Dirrtor, and Shareholders: Beven Things You Need to Know, DCBA BIUEF Jan. 2009,
httpVwww.dcbabrieforg/vol210109artl.html.
12 See Kraakman et al., supra note 9, at 1738; see also Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 488. As a
result of these derivative suits, directors and officers may be liable for civil penalties, face criminal
sanctions, and personal financial liability to the shareholders. See Jeff Gerrish, What is Your Real
Liability as a Director or Oficer?, A.B.A BANKING L.J. (March 15, 2010), available at
http://www.ababj.com/index2.php?option=com-content&dojpdf= 1&id= 1118&Itemid= 140; see also
Madden, supra note 11. These liabilities can serve as substantial deterrents to directors and officers
contemplating breaching their fiduciary duties, failing to pay taxes, committing securities fraud, or any
other action for which they could be held liable. Madden, supra note 11.
13 Directors can be sued for acts such as shaping policies that hurt the corporation, engaging in
"needlessly expensive financing," investing without outside consultation, and failing to investigate charges.
JOESEPH WARREN BISHOP II E[ AL, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION
AND INsURANCE 5 3:9 (Thompson Reuters 2011). However, directors are not personally liable for others'
acts unless they have personal knowledge of the wrongdoing or should have known of the wrongdoing. See
EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECrORS: RIGHTS,
DUTIES AND LIABIDTIES S 2:18 (Thomson Reuters 2011).
14 R Link Newcomb, Note, The Limitation of Directors' Lability: A Proposal fur Legislative Reform, 66
TEx. L REv. 411, 434 (1987).
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actions serves as a deterrent." Liability may arise through both
shareholder derivative suits and securities lawsuits.
A. D&O Liability in Derivative Suits for Breach of Corporate Duties
Directors and officers of a corporation are bound by certain duties and
when a duty is breached, shareholders may seek to hold them liable and
recover the value lost through a derivative lawsuit-suing the directors
and officers on behalf of the corporation."
In a lawsuit charging a breach of duty to the corporation, the directors
and officers are presumed to have acted in good faith and in the best
interests of the corporation.17 In the absence of bad faith or gross abuse of
discretion, the court-developed doctrine of the Business Judgment Rule
attaches and the courts will not interfere so long as the decision "may be
attributable to any rational business purpose."18 Thus, in bringng a
derivative suit, the Business Judgment Rule plays a major role. The
15 Kenneth E Scott, Corporation Law and the American law Institute Corporate Goveance Projects, 35
STAN. L REV. 927, 941 (1983). See also Newcomb, supra note 14, at 434-35. Often the prospect of a derivative
lawsuit is enough to deter misconduct. Kraakman et al., supra note 9, at 1738.
16 Directors and officers must use care and diligence in their management and administration
of the affairs of the corporation. J. F. Rydstrom, Liability of Corporate Directors for Negligence in Permitting
Mismanagement or Defalcations by Ofcers or Employees, 25 A.L.R.3D 941, at S 2[a] (1969); see also
discussion infra Part I.A. (expanding on the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith); Baker & Griffith,
supra note 2, at 494 (discussing shareholder derivative suits resulting from actions of directors and
officers).
17 Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487,493 (Del. 1966) (defining the Business Judgment Rule
as incorporating good faith and best interests). The business judgment rule is generally defined as "a
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company." Robert Roy, Duty of Corporate Directors to Exercise "Informed" Judgment in Recommending
Responses to Merger or Tender Offers, 46 A.L.R.4TH 887, at §3 (1986). But see Moran v. Household Intern,
Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch. 1985) (describing the rule as a "tool of judicial review and only
indirectly a standard of conduct for corporate management").
18 Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (explaining that the Business
Judgment Rule does not apply when directors act in bad faith or grossly abuse their discretion); Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (setting forth the "rational business purpose" test); see also
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (upholding immense severance package despite little evidence of
an informed decision-making process).
1 The business judgment rule is reflected in several aspects throughout the process, most
notably the concept of demand. A shareholder must either make a demand on the board to take action
and assert the claim or allege that demand was excused. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1215 (Del.
1996) ("The demand requirement is a recognition of the fundamental precept that directors manage
the business and affairs of the corporation.") (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
In states where demand is excused due to futility, one reason could be that the "underlying transaction
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protection afforded to directors under the rule is notoriously difficult for
plaintiffs to overcome, but because there are situations where
shareholders are able to recover against directors and officers for a breach
of the duties of care, loyalty, or good faith, directors and officers are
presumed to temper their behavior accordingly.
1. Duty of Care
Directors satisfy their duty of care-a gross negligence standard-if
they "inform[] themselves[,] 'prior to making a business decision, of all
material information reasonably available to them."'21 Thus, courts
is not the product of a valid exercise of business judgment." Id. at 1216 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at
814). Courts will normally apply the business judgment rule presumption in these situations looking
at various factors such as the interest and independence of the board, procedures followed when the
board was acting, and whether it was an egregious violation of business judgment. Marx v. Akers, 666
N.E.2d 1034, 1041 (N.Y. 1996) (holding demand is excused where the "challenged transaction is so
egregious such as a violation of a duty "that it could not have been the product of sound business
judgment").
2 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[Overcoming
the Business Judgment Rule] is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff
might hope to win a judgment."); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (requiring "a
showing of gross and palpable overreaching" to overcome the Business Judgment Rule once it attaches);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001-03 (NY. 1979) (describing that when a special litigation
committee (SLC) is appointed to inquire into a shareholders' allegations, the actions of the SLC in addition to
the initial actions alleged are also subject to the business judgment rule). However, in Delaware specifically,
shareholders have a slightly easier time as the burden of proof is on the SLC or the corporation to show that it
is subject to business judgment protection. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonaldo, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981)
(demonstrating that the court looks at the interest, independence, and procedures the SLC used and then
applies its own business judgment as to whether the case should be dismissed). See also Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876,978 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part) ("[B]y 'corporate
democracy,' presumably the Court means the rights of shareholders to vote and to bring derivative suits for
breach of fiduciary duty. In practice, however, many corporate lawyers will tell you that 'these rights are so
limited as to be almost nonexistent,' given the internal authority wielded by boards and managers and the
expansive protections afforded by the business judgment rule."). The plaintiff may rebut the presumption in
favor of the directors, resulting in a greater degree ofjudicial scrutiny, by proving that the director breached its
duty of care, loyalty, or good faith. If the plaintiff rebuts the presumption, the Business Judgment Rule will
not apply, and the directors must satisfy the formidable "entire fairness" test See discussion infia Parts IA
21 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). The duty of care generally requires that a director exercise reasonable care
in regards to all relevant information prior to making a decision, and in the performance of his general
responsibilities. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. See also In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 651-
52 (Del. Ch. 2008) (discussing that a gross negligence standard should be used in relation to the
business judgment rule so directors are not unduly hampered and can have leeway in decisions
without constant worry aboutjudicial oversight).
218 UNIVERSIY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 20:211
determine whether the decision-making process, as opposed to the substance
of the ultimate decision, was adequate.22 Once a court finds that the
process was inadequate (e.g. that the board was unreasonably informed),
the board cannot defend itself by reference to the substantive benefits of
their action or the legitimate purposes behind the decision.23 In addition,
the duty of care is an affirmative duty; that is, directors must be active and
inquire about the decision.24 Mere passive acquiescence is insufficient to
satisfy the duty of care.25
The outer limits of the duty of care were explored in Smith v. Van
Gorkom and Brehm v. Eisner.26 In Van Gorkom, the board's decision to sell
the company was not protected by the Business Judgment Rule because
the decision was made during a two-hour meeting, after hearing a short
and inaccurate presentation by the CEO, and without having read the
contract for sale.27 Yet, in Eisner, the court may have partially retreated
from Van Gorkom in favor of greater judicial deference. In Eisner, the
board approved an immense severance package, complete with options
that automatically vested upon a no-fault termination. 9 Despite the fact
that an executive compensation expert, hired by the board to review the
severance package, did not even read the contract, and only one paragraph
2 See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *8
(Del. Ch. June 24, 1991) (stating the due care element of the Business Judgment Rule as "an objective
review of the process by which [the board] reached the decision under review") (emphasis added).
2 Seegenerally Van Gorkom, 488 A2d at 858 (ignoring directors' claims that the merger would benefit
the company by converting otherwise unrealizable tax credits to realizable tax credits).
24 See, e.g., In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (suggesting in dicta that directors may be
personally liable for failing to affirmatively inquire to ensure that an adequate internal control system
exists); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826-30 (N.J. 1981) (finding elderly director of a
family business liable for failing to prevent misappropriation of funds by related officers because the
director did not take any affirmative action, such as reading the financial statements). The duty of care
also incorporates good faith, and decision-making that does not to lead to the waste of corporate assets
or other abuses of discretion. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988).
2 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 823; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (stating that the Business Judgment
Rule does not afford protection "where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a
conscious decision, failed to act"); Harman v. Willbern, 374 F.Supp. 1149, 1161 (D. Kan. 1974)
(stating that directors are responsible for knowing all facts that they reasonably should have known or
discovered).
2 Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858; Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A2d 244 (Del. 2000).
27 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875; see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del.
Ch. 2003) (finding Business Judgment Rule did not cover the conduct of the directors where the
CEO of Disney unilaterally decided to hire someone and board did not inquire into the decision or
the employment agreement).
2 Eisner, 746 A2d 244.
2 Id.at 250.
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in the board minutes addressed the package, the court found inadequate
evidence that the directors failed to reasonably inform themselves.30
Although the Business Judgment Rule defers to decisions made by
corporate directors, it is still within the court's discretion to find for a
plaintiff when directors breach the duty of care.
2. Duty of Loyalty
A plaintiff may also rebut the presumption in favor of directors by
proving a breach of the duty of loyalty.3 1 Directors breach the duty of
loyalty by using their "position of trust and confidence to further their
private interests.'32 Thus, they may not "do anything that would work
injury to the corporation," including the usurpation of a corporate
opportunity.33 For example, a person may breach this duty by serving as
director of corporations on both sides of a transaction or by receiving
some material benefit from the transaction not received by the
shareholders. 34 However, if the defendant director can prove that all
material facts surrounding the conflict of interest were disclosed and that
a majority of the disinterested directors or shareholders ratified the
decision, the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs and the Business
Judgment Rule applies. 35
30 Id. at 259.
31 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,358 (Del. 1993).
32 Idat 361. A breach of the duty of loyalty can include situations where there are competing
interests, usurpation of a corporate opportunity, or deleting a restricting covenant in an employment contract.
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonaldo, 430 A2d 779,788 (Del. 1981); Egnell, Inc. v. Weniger, 94 111. App. 3d 325,
329 (1981). However, seeking indemnity against claims arising out of a merger and approving separate sales of
assets to third parties are situations where the duty is not breached. See In re Sea-Land Corp. S'holders Litig.,
642 A2d 792,805 (Del. Ch. 1993).
3 Cede & Co. v. Technicor, Inc., 634 A.2d at 361 (stating that directors must not "deprive [the
corporation] of profit or advantage which [their] skill and ability might properly bring to it").
3 Id. at 362; see also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1167 (Del. 1995)
(holding that any personal benefit received must be "material" to overcome the business judgment
presumption). BISHOP II ET AL., supra note 13 ("The vast majority of reported decisions holding
directors liable for breach of fiduciary duty rest on self-dealing or conflict of interest, not
negligence.").
3s See In re Wheelabrator Tech., Inc., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995) (shifting burden
back to plaintiffs because a fully informed shareholder vote approved the disputed merger). BISHOP II
ET AL., supra note 13 ("A transaction involving interested directors will not be set aside if the
transaction was fair, was approved by independent directors upon disclosure of all material factors, or
was approved by the shareholders upon disclosure of all material facts." (citations omitted)).
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3. Duty of Good Faith
Plaintiffs also can rebut the presumption by proving that the directors
acted in bad faith or with a dishonest purpose.36 In these cases, the
plaintiff must make "factual assertions of specific wrongdoing" as opposed
to "conclusory allegations."3 7 The duty of faith is not as clearly defined as
the other duties owed.38 If successful in a shareholder derivative suit, the
directors and officers can be held liable to the corporation for the losses
that resulted from the breach of their fiduciary duties.
Cumulatively, the remedies available for breach of these duties of care
provide a multi-layered deterrent. In addition to the duties of care,
securities lawsuits provide yet another layer of deterrence. Unlike
shareholder derivative suits which typically result in unwanted publicity
and changes to corporate governance, securities lawsuits provide
deterrence because of the sheer magnitude of potential personal liability.
B. D&O Liability in Securities Law Suits
Shareholder derivate suits include both breach of duty claims as
described above and securities law claims under the Securities Act of 1933
and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.39 Securities law claims generally
36 Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
3 Id.
3 "The duty to act in good faith is, up to this point relatively uncharted. Because of the
increased recognition of the importance of good faith, some conceptual guidance to the corporate
community may be helpful. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006)." It
encompasses subjective bad faith (conduct motivated by an actual intent to do harm) and gross
negligence without more is not a showing of bad faith. Id. Therefore, the duty of good faith is at the
other end of the spectrum from the duty of care. Id. But see Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del.
2006) (clarifying that the duty of good faith is part of the duty of loyalty, not a separate basis for
liability); See generally In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 959 (expressing only duties
of care and loyalty).
3 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. S 77a (2009); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
S 78a (2009). The most common securities law claims arise under Rule lOb-5 in 5 10(b) of the
Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. S 771 (2000); 17 C.F.R. 5 240.10b-5 (2006). Rule 10b-5 claims
may be brought for any misrepresentation made "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 497 n.43 (internal citations omitted); Hyeesoo Hyun
Chung & Jinyoung Park Wynn, Managerial Legal Liability Coverage and Earnings Conservatism, 46 J.
AccT. & ECON. 135, 138 (2008). The second most common securities law claims, involving false
registration statements made in connection with the sale of securities, arise under Section 11 the
Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. S 77k (2009). The third most common securities law claims
arise under 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. 5 771(a)(2) (2009) (stating that Section
12(2) claims may be brought against anyone who "offers or sells" a security by use of a prospectus or
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focus on fraud or false or misleading representations made by the
corporation in connection with a disclosure required by federal securities
law.' In addition to indirect liability through a shareholder derivative
suit, directors and officers may also be sued directly by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for violations of the federal securities
laws.41
Shareholder derivative suits for breach of the corporate duties as well
as the SEC mechanisms for suing directors and officers shift the burden
of errors in judgment (as well as blatantly inappropriate conduct) by
directors and officers from the shareholder to the directors and officers.
New shareholder derivative suits and securities class action suits are filed
each year and remind directors and officers that the threat of liability is
bona fide.42 In fact, between January 1, 1996 and June 30, 2010,
Cornerstone Research identified 3,120 federal securities class action
filings.43 In 2009, the average securities class action settlement rose more
than thirty percent to $37.2 million making the magnitude of liability
increasingly daunting." This liability-both professional and personal-
of the directors and officers serves as a deterrent effect against errant and
inappropriate conduct and has resulted in risk management mechanisms
oral communication which contains an omission or false or misleading statement of a material fact).
4 Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 497.
41 Dobiac, supra note 11, at 491.
42 Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2009: A Year in Review 12 (2009),
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse-research/2009YIR/CornerstoneResearchFilings_2009
YIR.pdf (explaining 9.2 percent of all S&P 500 Companies faced new filings in 2008 and 4.6 percent
faced new filings in 2009).
4 Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2010 Mid-Year Assessment 2 (2010),
httpV/www.cornerstone.cor/files/Publication/a4e3e805-eoc7-4c6f-9flc-
3cee924a6bl9/Presentation/PublicationAttachmen28990788-04f9-4ffd-938f-
419be91146b6/ComerstoneResearchFilings 2010_MidYearAssessmentpdf (stating 3,120 as the total
number and 195 as the average number of federal securities class action filngs between January 1, 1996 and
June 30, 2010).
4 Cornerstone Research, Securities dass Action Settlements: 2009 Review and Analysis 2 (2009),
httpV//ww.google.conVurl?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=OCFEQFjAB&url=http
/o3A%2F%2Fwww.cornerstone.com%2Ffiles%2FPublication%l2Fab95c24-3653-4lca-909f-
e996035c1c48/o2FPresentation%2FPublicationAttachnent%2Fabdb55f-1e09-4al6-9aOf-
ebb0cc432145%2FCornerstoneResearchSetdements_2009_Analysis.pdf&ei=FlbrT4COG6f5gGe1rnCBQ
&usg=AFQCNFqq8c5kaU50dy4lQeh5r8tZetF9A&sig2=qV3fGVqiXuPB8kRHbZ3gMw (stating "the
average settlement rose from $28.4 million in 2008 to $37.2 million in 2009").
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II. D&O INSURANCE AND ITS ALIGNMENT WITH D&O LIABILITY'S
DETERRENT EFFECT
A. Background on D&O Insurance
D&O insurance initially emerged from Lloyd's of London in the
1930's as a response to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.45 Few corporations purchased D&O insurance in
the early days because indemnifying directors and officers was contrary to
public policy.46 Over the next few decades, however, corporations
advocated that "a key ingredient to effective corporate management was
the protection of corporate officials from personal liability."47 By early to
mid-1960, many states adopted new statutes explicitly permitting D&O
insurance 48 and in the 1970S49 state legislatures permitted the
indemnification of corporate directors and officers.so For D&O insurance,
the 1970's presented a time of continued growth and relatively low costs."
Today, almost all publicly held corporations carry D&O insurance
policies allowing some management of personal and corporate liability.52
Although D&O insurance is no longer considered by the courts and
legislature as contrary to public policy," the insurers have placed
limitations on who they will cover and for what.'
4s See Dobiac, supra note 11, at 487 n.6; Joseph P. Monteleone, Directors and Ofcers Liability
Insurance: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 and other Topical Issues, SH077 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 313 (2002).
4 Dobiac, supra note 11, at 488; Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conta, Directors and
Oficers Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Overview ofLegal and Practical Issues, 51 Bus. LAw. 573,
574 (1996).
4 Monteleone & Conta, supra note 46, at 574.
4 SeeJohnston, Jr., supra note 10, at 1995-2005.
49 See Dobiac, supra note 11, at 488; Monteleone & Conta, supra note 46, at 574.
so Michael D. Sousa, Making Sense of the Bramble-Filled Thicket: The "Insured vs. Insured"
Exclusion in the Bankruptcy Context, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEv.J. 365, 372 (2007) (noting that "[I]n 1965,
approximately less than 10% ofcorporations carried directors and officers liability insurance; by 1971,
however, approximately 70% to 80% of all major corporations had purchased liability insurance for
their directors and officers."). See also Monteleone & Conta, supra note 46, at 574.
st See Dobiac, supra note 11, at 488.
52 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 487 n.2; Dobiac, supra note 11, at 488; TOWERS PERRIN,
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILIY SURVEY: 2006 SURVEY OF INSURANCE PURCHASING AND CLAIMS
TRENDS (2006) available at httpV/www.towerspemn.conVtp/getwebcachedoc.webc= HRS/US2007/
20070IDOSurveyReport2006040507.pdf
5 TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFrrH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: How LIABILFlY
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER ITIGATION 14-15 (The University ofChicago Press 2010).
5 See discussion inf4a Part II.B.
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Three distinct types of D&O insurance exist: A-Side, B-Side," and C-
Side coverage." A-Side Coverage, individual coverage, indemnifies
corporate directors and officers for personal liability.57
While each D&O liability insurance policy includes unique
characteristics, these policies "typically cover settlement amounts, legal
fees, and compensatory damages."" In addition the policies contain three
common exclusions: 1) claims for actual fraud59 ; 2) claims in which the
director or officer committed the acts at issue prior to the start of the
policy; and 3) claims between named insureds on the policy, such as when
the corporation sues a director or officer.'
B. D&O Insurance as a Facilitator ofDeterrence
D&O insurers facilitate deterrence through a variety of mechanisms
including exclusions, selective underwriting, offering input for the
company's corporate governance, and withholding coverage from
fraudulent directors and officers. The exclusions deter wrongdoing
because there is no risk management mechanism and you bear the risk.
On a corporate level, the D&O literature provides explanations for why
firms purchase D&O insurance as well as its potential relation to the
quality of firm governance;6 1 D&O insurance helps manage liability risk62
and helps monitor the firms' officers.'
ss B-Side coverage, institutional coverage, indemnifies payments the corporation may make to its
directors and officers. See Dobiac, supra note 11, at 491-92; MARC H. FAuADORI, STOCK OPnON
BACKDATING - REGUIATORS AND PLAtINTIFFs TAKE THE CONTROVERSY TO THE NExT LEVEL, IN
PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DIsCLosuRE DOCUMENTS 666 (2007).
56 C-Side coverage, or "entity coverage," provides coverage for the corporation's actual liability to
shareholders in suits where the corporation itself is a named party. See Dobiac, supra note 11, at 491-92;
Falladori, supra note 55; Sousa, supra note 50, at 381.
57 See Dobiac, supra note 11, at 491-92. A-Side Coverage protects directors and officers even when
the corporation is financially unable to (due to insolvency or bankruptcy), or is legally unable to (due to
prohibitions under state corporate law or the corporation's own by-laws or articles of incorporation). Sousa,
supra note 50, at 374-75. While Side-B and Side-C coverages typically include retention or co-insurance
provisions, Side-A typically does not Thus individual officers and directors are indemnified from the first
dollar, while the corporation typically assumes the liability risk up to a dollar ceiling. See Baker & Griffith, supra
note 2, at 500.
5 See Dobiac, supra note 11, at 492.
5 The fraud exclusion typically defines fraud in a way that excludes any "dishonest or
fraudulent act or omission or any criminal act or omission or any willful violation of any statute, rule,
or law." Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 500 n.58 (internal citations omitted).
60 See id. at 492-93.
61 See John E. Core, On de Corporate Demandfor Dirctors' and Ofcers' Insurance, 64 J. RISK& INS. 63,
68 (1997); Noel O'Sullivan, Insuring dreAgents: The Role ofDirectors' and Offiers'Insurana in Corporate Goverance,
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D&O insurers act as an intermediary between the shareholders and
management by covering the risk of shareholder derivate suits.' Because
they cover the risk, D&O insurers engage in selective underwriting which
furthers the deterrent effect on directors and officers." D&O insurers
carefully screen prospective corporations, rejecting or increasing
premiums for those with a high risk of liability. 6 However, when a
number of underwriters, D&O insurance claims managers, actuaries and
risk managers were interviewed"7 and asked "whether underwriters do a
good job of pricing D&O risks, several of [them] were openly skeptical."
The interviewees indicated that the D&O "underwriters did not have a
consistent system of evaluation that applie[d] the same factors in the same
way over time."69 This lack of uniformity in method or quantum of
64J. RISK& INS. 545,547-50 (1997).
62 See generally Core, supra note 61, at 68.
6 See Core, supra note 61 at 67-68; O'Sullivan, supra note 61, at 547-50.
64 Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 487-88. Shareholders seek to recover value of the corporation
lost due to actions (or inaction) by the directors and officers through a derivate lawsuit--suing the directors
and officers on behalf of the corporation. Derivative suits hold the directors and officers personally
accountable for their actions. This need for personal liability arises from several sources including a desire for
retribution, a need to deter similar future misconduct, and the difficulty inherent in preventing an enterprise
from corporate misconduct
65 Id. at 488. Deterrence is based on the premise that "the burden of liability fall more heavily on bad
actors." Id. at 533. But with D&O insurance that may not be the case. The difference between premiums of
high risk and low risk companies are not as large as they should be because of market forces. Id.
6 Id.
67 BAKER& GRIFITH,supra note 53, at 14-15 (conducting a study from 2005 to 2007 by interviewing
twenty-one underwriters from fourteen companies, twelve claims managers from ten D&O insurance
companies, twenty-three lawyers who specialize in shareholder litigation, ten lawyers who specialize in
representing D&O insurance companies in monitoring and settling shareholder litigation, six brokers, four
risk managers, three D&O actuaries, five policyholder coverage counsel, three mediators of shareholder
litigation settlements, two experts in shareholder litigation damages, and two claims advisors).
6 Id. at 98 (attributing some of the difficulty in assessing D&O risk with the inherent nature of the
insureds, the CEOs and CFOs who are able to deceive sophisticated company board members and investors
are likely going to be able to deceive the underwriters as well).
69 Underwriters consider a variety of factors in assessing D&O liability risk. Baker & Griffith,
supra note 2, at 508. The underwriters place significant weight on corporate governance, a reflection of
its importance in predicting liability risk. Id. at 517. In particular, underwriters look at both the
character of individual officers and directors and how strong the "norm of compliance" is within the
firm. Id. Underwriters also consider a number of factors that are not directly related to corporate
governance, such as the type of industry, the size of the corporation, whether the industry is in a start-
up, growth, or mature industry, the nature of the product or service that the firm sells, and various
accounting ratios. Id. at 494-95, 514-15.
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information used in underwriting D&O insurance policies undermines
the efficacy of selective underwriting.o
D&O insurers can also recommend changes to corporate governance
practices of their insureds before covering potential losses." When
lawsuits arise, the insurers can manage the defense and settlement of
derivative suits, along with defense costs. 72  Again, when actual insurers
and brokers were interviewed, they indicated that the insurance market
and consumer preference limited them from actively monitoring the
insureds or having much power in the litigation process.73
Insurers will also withhold insurance benefits from directors and
officers who have engaged in fraudulent activity.74 These practices deter
officers and directors from engaging in harmful conduct or otherwise
violating their duties in a way that is likely to trigger litigation,'75  thus
70 Dobiac, supra note 11, at 506-07. According to Dobiac, "[D&O underwriting] is
frequently driven more by intuition than by an automated or computerized underwriting scheme." Id.
at 502. With so many options in how to underwrite a D&O insurance policy and so many potential
outcomes, it is getting increasingly more difficult to properly gauge the risk. Id. at 506. Dobiac argues
that because there is a threat to the efficacy of a D&O liability underwriter's judgment due to the
"large number of compromises and rapid processing of noisy information," the value of individual
underwriting may not be superior and may even create greater variability in outcomes than traditional
underwriting. Id. Selective underwriting is also weakened by the fact that underwriting departments
"are not perfect agents of the insurance company as a whole." BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 53, at
99. Underwriters will make imprudent underwriting decisions when under pressure to generate
immediate revenues despite the fact that it will result in a loss several years later. Id.
71 Baker & Griffith, supra note Z at 489.
72 This provides more deterrence to directors and officers who might not want to cede control to
insurers would could "vigorously fight and stubbornly refuse to settle nuisance claims and, in the event that
genuine corporate wrongdoing is uncovered, insist on a greater contribution to settlement from the corporate
insured. BAKER& GRIFFITH,supra note 53, at 129.
7 Id. at 105-51.
7 Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 501.
7 See discussion supra Part I.C; but see Dobiac, supra note 11, at 512 (arguing that increased
premiums is not enough for "high risk firms to change their governance structure because the cost of
doing so would be higher than the savings associated with lower premiums."); See Tom Baker & Sean
Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors & Ofcers Liability Insurer, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1795 (2007) (noting that while D&O insurance acts to deter directors and officers from
committing social wrongs, the D&O insurance does not have a strong enough effect on corporate
governance to change behavior). D&O insurance often costs very little in comparison to overall costs
such that the company can easily absorb the expense without taking it into account as a significant part
of the budget or something to focus on for cost savings. Dobiac, supra note 11, at 512-13. According to
the 2008 Towers Watson survey, the average premium paid by public organizations was $482,089.
PERRIN SURVEY, supra note 52, at 27. For organizations with assets between $5 and $10 billion the
average total premium was $1,454,607, and for organizations with assets between $100 million and
$400 million the average total premium was $381,162. Id. at 30. For a $10 billion company, that
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marrying the deterrent effect and D&O liability with the market for D&O
insurance.
Scholars have used D&O coverage to infer information about the
overall quality of firm governance." Their research provides a variety of
explanations for why firms obtain D&O insurance, including the concepts
that firms with higher risk are more likely to purchase coverage with
higher limits" and that outside directors at larger firms as well as D&O
insurers provide a source of monitoring for the firm's managers.
Similarly, firms with "greater inside ownership will purchase more
insurance because of the insiders' risk aversion."79
It is worth noting that this scholarship is not consistent Other research finds
that D&O premiums are positively related to excess CEO compensation, implying
weak corporate governance.' In a study of Canadian firms, Chung & Wynn
found that obtaining D&O insurance is associated with less conservative earnings
reports by managers.8 ' These questionable reports include the timely reporting of
bad news. Further, in their analysis of a sample of 1POs, Chalmers et a. find that
firms purchasing insurance in conjunction with an IPO are likely to have lower
stock price performance three years after the transaction, suggesting that perhaps
D&O purchases are likely to reveal opportunistic behavior from managers.82 This
scholarship reflects that D&O insurance is not always directly tied to deterrence in
every respect Nonetheless, the overall correlation between selective underwriting
in the marketplace and deterrence remains.
means that the premium could be 0.01% of the of company assets, and for a $400 million company,
the premium might be less than 0.1% of the company assets. Id. at 30-34. Although the survey does
not make a distinction between companies who have a history of good versus bad company practices,
it is questionable that such premiums, or even premiums that are double or triple the average
premium reported, would be consequential enough to impact the behavior ofdirectors and officers.
76 See John M.R. Chalmers, Larry Y. Dann & Jarrad Harford, Managerial Opportunism?
Evidence from Directors' and Ofcers' Insurance Purchases, 57 J. FIN. 609 (2002) (defining managerial
opportunism as management's use of inside information to gain private benefits). For example,
management may issue an IPO when the shares may be over-valued. See generally John M.R.
Chalmers, Larry Y. Dann & Jarrad Harford, Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors' and Officers'
Insurance Purchases, 57 J. FIN. 609 (2002).
7 Core, supra note 61, at 84.
78 O'Sullivan, supra note 61, at 552.
7 Core, supra note 61, at 85.
8 John E. Core, The Directors' and Officers' Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the
Quality ofCorporate Governance, 16J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449,475 (2000).
81 Chung &Jinyoung, supra note 39, at 151.
8 Chalmers, Dann & Harford, supra note 76, at 633; but see Martin Boyer, Cirang Is the Demand for
Corporate Insurance a Habit? Evidence from Dirtors and Offiers Insurance 3 (2003) available at
http//www.cirano.qc.ca/pdt7publication/2003s-4Zpdf
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III. RECENT CORPORATE SCANDALS AND THEm "SHOCKING"
IMPACT
The dramatic series of events associated with the corporate scandals of
the early twenty-first century arguably created a "shock" in the D&O
insurance marketplace profoundly and unexpectedly altering the market.
These corporate scandals interrupted the typical D&O insurance cycle in
extreme ways. The onslaught of corporate scandals in the early 2000's
brought an increase in the assessment of losses that could be associated
with the actions of directors and officers.' Scholars have addressed the
impact that large loss shocks have had on the insurance marketplace in
previous cycles.' Specifically, prior literature suggests that demand may
increase "as a result of an actual or perceived increase in actuarial losses
covered by a given contract," a concept referred to as probability
updating." This section of the paper addresses the impact of the recent
corporate governance shocks on the D&O liability insurance marketplace
so that we can later address impact on the deterrent effect.
A. Effect of Liability Cycles
Liability insurance goes through "hard" and "soft" cycles which can be
driven by broad market forces or by specific events. D&O insurance is no
exception. For example, in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court changed
the landscape of D&O insurance in its landmark case Smith v. Van
Gorkom." The lawsuits of the mid-1980's and the judicial interpretation
& Baker & Griffith, supra note 2.
8 See J. David Cummins & Patricia M. Danzon, Prie, Financial Quality, and Capital Flows in Insurance
Markets, 6 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 3, 3-38 (1997); Anne Gron, Capacity Constraints and Cydes in Property-
Casualty Insurance Markets, 25 J. EcON. 110, 110-27 (1994); Gene C. Lai et al., Great (and Not So Great)
Expectations: An Endognous Economic Explication of Insurae Cyles and Liability Cries, 67 J. RISK & INS. 617, 617-
52 (2000); Mary A. Weiss &Joon-Hai Chung, U.S. Reinsurance Prices Financial Quality, and Global Capacity, 71
J. RISK& INS. 437,437-67 (2004).
85 Kenneth A. Froot & Paul G. J. O'Connell, The Pricing of U.S. Catastrophe Reinsurance, in THE
FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 195- 96 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999).
8 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858. The 1985 case, Smith v. Van Gorkom, was a landmark decision in the
United States as it clarified the requisites for a breach of the fiduciary duty of care. Van Gorkom involved the
sale of Trans Union Corporation. Id Jerome Van Gorkom, the CEO and a significant stockholder of Trans
Union, discussed selling the company with some of his fellow executives, but only preliminarily. As part of
these discussions, he received basic financial data on financing the buyout. Id. at 865. Using this information,
Van Gorkom approached the potential buyer who offered to purchase Trans Union. Van Gorkom called a
meeting of the Trans Union board on only two days notice. Id. at 867. At the meeting, he gave an oral
presentation but did not provide financial analysis or any written documentation, and did not disclose the
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of director and officer liability under federal securities laws brought
increased exposure to directors, officers, and the corporation itself. Due
to a variety of factors including an increased frequency of lawsuits and
increased risks facing corporate directors and officers, the D&O insurance
liability industry entered a hard cycle." In a hard cycle, underwriters
become more selective, more interested in higher attachment points, less
willing to offer high limits, less willing to negotiate contract terms, and
able to command dramatically higher prices for what amounts to less
coverage."
As depicted in Figure 1,' D&O liability insurance experienced a soft
cycle during most of the 1990's. " During a soft cycle, insurers compete
circumstances of the negotiation process. Id. The board asked very few follow-up questions before approving
the merger. Id. at 868. The Delaware Supreme Court found that the board's actions violated the duty of care
and that the board acted in a grossly negligent manner in deciding to accept the offer. Id. at 873. The court
based its conclusion on the finding that he board did not act on an informed basis when making its decision to
proceed with the acquisition. Id at 873-74. Before Van Gorkom, courts did not find directors personally liable
absent a conflict of interest. However, in Van Gorkom, the court found the directors liable based solely on the
breach of the duty of care. Id. at 893. See discussion supra Part IA William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standamis of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW.
1287, i. 49 (2001) (noting that after Van Gorkom, the D&O insurance industry sharply increased their
premiums, and in some cases threatened to stop writing D&O insurance policies); Henry N. Butler, Smith v.
Van Gorkom, Jurisdictional Competition, and the Role of Random Mutations in the Evfution of Corporate Law, 45
WASHBURN LJ. 267, n.19 (2006) ("The initial effect of Van Gorkom was to increase directors and officers
insurance rates or to make D&O insurance unavailable."); Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Dietor?
Revitalizing Diretors' Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HouS. L REv. 393, 415 (2005); Justice Jack. B.
Jacobs, The Vanishing Substance-Procedure Distinction in Contemporary Corporate Litgation: An Esay, 41 SUFFoLK
U. L REV. 1, 8 (2007) ("Van Gorkom's . .. impact was to create a national directors and officers liability
insurance crisis. The insurance industry reacted to the decision by raising the cost of D&O liability insurance
to almost prohibitive levels, and in some cases, stopped providing D&O insurance altogether."); Sousa, supra
note 50, at 374 (stating that the Van Gorkom decision caused insurance companies to become "skittish" about
issuing liability insurance coverage for a corporation's directors and officers). See also Lloyd L Drury, III,
What's the Cost of a Free Pass? A Call for the Re-Assesmnent of Statutes drat Allowfor the Elimination of Personal Liability
for Directors, 9 TRANsACnONs: TENN. J. Bus. L 99, 105-07 (2007); Florence Shu-Acquaye, Smith v. Van
Gorkom Revisited: Lessons Learned in Ight of the Sarbanes-Odey Act of 2002, 3 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 19
(2004).
8 See Dobiac, supra note 11, at 488; Monteleone & Conta, supra note 46, at 574.
8 See discussion infra, Part I; Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 507.
8 Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 507.
90 Capacity and premium data used for the construction of Figure 1 graphs are obtained from annual
Towers Perrin Directors and Officers Liability surveys. See PERRIN SURVEY, supra note 52. Capacity data are
only available from 1991 to 2003 and D&O Premium Index data are available from 1991 to 2008. The D&O
Premium Index is based on a "typical" for-profit survey respondent and is provided on an aggregate basis.
Both premium and capacity data used in the creation of the graphs in Figure 1 represent median values.
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for business and corporations can obtain broader coverage at better prices
and terms.9 As insurers compete for new business during a soft market,
underwriting standards may diminish and insurers may be willing to
accept greater risks than would otherwise be acceptable without increasing
competitive pressures. As the millennium approached, the market for
D&O liability insurance began to harden once again as corporate scandals
associated with weak corporate governance resulted in legal action against
directors and officers.93
Figure 1
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
9 See Gary Lockwood, D&O Insurance: Cycle of Change, PLUS Journal, vol. XVI, No. 10, at 3
(2003), available at http://www.lordbissell.com/Newsstand/Lockwood-D&Olnsurance-PLUS10-
2003.pdf; Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 508; Dobiac, supra note 11, at 488.
9 See Lockwood, supra note 91; Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 508; Dobiac, supra notell, at
488.
9 See Dobiac, supra note 11, at 488-89.
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B. Effect of Corporate Scandals on the Market
Beginning with Enron, the new millennium, however, unleashed
intense corporate scandals that are well documented in the literature.94
Commentators consider the pervasive fraud at Enron, a Texas-based
energy company, the "granddaddy of all corporate fraud cases." 5 Under
aggressive management, Enron engaged in risky investments, inflated
accounting figures, and avoided full disclosures.' In a matter of months,
Enron went from one of the leading companies on Wall Street to the
biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history;97 four thousand employees lost their
jobs (many also lost their life savings) and investors lost billions.98
Following the collapse and investigations by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), fifteen former company executives pled guilty and
received sentences.9
In the midst of the Enron scandal, numerous other corporate scandals
emerged. Examples include WorldCom, where more than $3.8 billion in
accounting fraud resulted in SEC fraud charges;'" Adelphia, whose
founder was convicted in 2004 of conspiracy, bank fraud, and securities
fraud after hiding company debt, deceiving investors, and stealing
company cash;"o' and Tyco, whose former CEO and CFO were convicted
of stealing more the $150 million of company funds.o2
9 See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sadanes-Oley as Quack Corporate Govemnance: How
Wise is the Receied Widom?, 95 GEO. LJ. 1843, 1892-96 (2007); Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet,
FORBES (Aug. 8,2002,5:30 PM), http/Avww.forbes.conv200Z/07/25/accountingtracker.html.
9 Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Gomance Failures and the Managerial Duty ofCare, 76 ST.JOHN'S L REV.
767, 767 (2002); Shaheen Pasha & Jessica Seid, Lay and Skilling's Day of Reconing, CNN MONEY (May 25,
2006, 735 PM), http//money.cnn.com/200 05/25/news/newsmakers/enron verdict/index.htm.
96 The Fall ofEmon: How Er-CEOJeffSkilling's Straegy Grew So Complex That Even his Bass Couldn't
Get a Handle On It, Bus. WK., Dec. 17, 2001, available at
httpVAvww.businessweekcorrm/magazine/content/01_51/b3762001.htm.
9 Pasha & Seid, supra note 95.
9 Id.
9 Kristen Hays, A Sordid Chapter on Enron is Ending: Kenneth Rice is the Final Figure to Be
Punished Ajier Pleading Guilty to Crimes in the Scandal, Hous. CHRON., (June 18, 2007, 5:30 AM),
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpVspeciaVenron/4897649.htnl.
10 WoridCom's Sony Legacy Its Downfall May Hurt Rivals and Kil Tekwm Competition, Bus. WK, Jul. 8,
2002, at 38, available at httpVAvww.businessweekcom/niagazine/content2_27/b3790018.htm. See also
Patsuris, supra note 94.
' Addphia Founderjohn Rgas Found Guilty After 8 Day of Ddiberations Jury Returns Partial Settlement,
CORPORATE SCANDALS ON MSNBC (ul. 8, 2004, 6:07 PM), httpVlwww.msnbc.msn.conid/5396406;
Patsuris, supra note 94.
102 imeline of the To International Scandal, USA TODAY, (Jun. 17, 2005 4:11 PM), available at
httpVAww.usatoday.cof/money/industries/manu ftwrig2005-06-17-tyco-timeline _x.htm; see also Patsuris,
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The unprecedented number of highly publicized scandals in the early
twenty-first century rocked the D&O insurance industry.'0o The number
of lawsuits naming individual directors and officers increased
dramatically, and damages, settlements, and the costs of litigation
soared.'?"
C. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Federal Response to Corporate Government
Scandals
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (SOX), os declaring, "[n]o more easy money for corporate
criminals; just hard time."" SOX raced through Congress, criminalizing
new behavior and significantly increasing the penalties for existing
crimes. 07  The Act added new requirements designed to increase
corporate compliance with legal and ethical standards.'s
SOX responded directly to the multitude of scandals by including
provisions tied to criminal wrongdoings revealed during the scandals
and by targeting punishments meant to deter future corporate
misconduct."0 In addition, the Act created personal accountability for the
supra note 94.
103 Anjali C. Das, The ABCs of D&O Insurance: An Illinois Lawyer's Guide, 93 ILL. BJ. 304, 304
(2005); Fairfax, supra note 86, at 415; Sousa, supra note 50, at 375-76 (noting an increase in premiums
after the Enron, Adelphia Communications, and Tyco scandals); see also Kate Burgess, Directors' and
oficers Insurance: Set to Rise, FIN. TIMES (April 24, 2008, 5:41 PM),
http://www.ft.conVcms/s1/1bfc7040-d39b-1lda-b2f3-0000779e2340.html; Mairi Mallon, U.S. D&O
Lulled into a False Sense of Security?, Reinsurance Magazine, Nov. 1, 2006, at 20; Randy Paar, Insurance
Coverage in the World of Sarbanes-Oxley 852 PLI/CoMM 217 (June 2003).
104 Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 510; ROBERTW. HAMILTON &JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILYIY COMPANIES
970 (9th ed. 2005).
1os Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, S 903(a)-(b), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116
Stat.) 745, 805 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 5 1341, 1343).
106 Press Release, George W. Bush, President of the U.S., President Bush Signs Corporate
Corruption Bill (July 30, 2002), at http.//georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2002/07/20020730.html.
107 Paul Fiorelli, Organizational Sentencing: Federal Guidelines and the Benefits ofPrograms to Prevent
and Detect Violations of Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 565, 572-73 (2004).
10" See Rebecca Walker, The Evolution of the Law of Corpoate Compliance in the United States A Brief
Overview, 1623 PLI/CORP 13,40-41 (2007).
10 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 5 802, 116 Stat. 745, 800-801
(2002) (criminal penalties for altering documents); Id. S 807 (criminal penalties for defrauding
shareholders of publicly traded companies); Id. S 903 (criminal penalties for mail and wire fraud).
110 See Id. S 1106 (increased criminal penalties under Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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corporations' directors and officers with almost no forgiveness for
financial inaccuracies and/or a lack of transparency."' Overall, lawmakers
intended SOX to restore the integrity of the marketplace.112
In its effort to prevent future wrongdoing, SOX also created more
liability risk for directors and officers." 3 As a result, D&O insurance
premiums increased approximately 30% in 2001 and 30% in 2002." In
2003, premiums increased 33%.ts Premiums for the largest companies,
those with market capitalizations of $5 billion or more, increased as much
as 70% in 2004." In an attempt to quantify the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley, a
survey of mostly mid-cap companies found that the cost of being public
almost doubled, from $1.3 million to almost $2.5 million." 7  D&O
liability insurance, which averaged $329,000 prior to Sarbanes-Oxley and
grew to $639,000 afterwards,"' accounted for approximately two thirds of
the increased expense. The personal liability of the CEO and CFO, who
must sign off on the company's financial statements, is largely credited
with the increased premiums." 9
D. Corporate Governance Scandal's "Shock" to the D&O Insurance Market
The corporate scandals of the early twenty-first century altered our
perspective on corporate liability and interrupted the typical D&O
insurance cycle in extreme ways, arguably creating a "shock." A "shock" is
a dramatic event or series of events that causes a reexamination of
assumptions and rules. 20 Not only did the shock result in a
I" See, e.g, Id. S 302 (requiring officers to certify reports required under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
112 Prentice & Spence, supra note 94, at 1868; J. Brent Wilkins, The Sarbanes-Ohey Act of 2002: The
Ripple Ejects ofRestoring Shareholder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. L.J. 339,340 (2005).
113 See Walker, supra note 108; see also Sousa, supra note 50, at 377-78.
114 JOHN F. OLSON ET AL., DIRECTOR & OFFICER LIABIUY: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE
S4.26 (2011).
115 Id.
116 HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 104, at 970. But see OLSON ET AL., supra note 114, at S 4.26
(stating premiums decreased in 2004). But see OLSON ET AL., supra note 114, at S 4.26 (stating premiums
decreased in 2004).
117 Wilkins, supra note 112, at 347.
118 Wilkins, supra note 112, at 348.
119 Wilkins, supra note 112, at 347.
120 See Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge-The Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical Problems in the
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 14 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 193, 196 (2005); see also A. A. Sommer, Jr.,
Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berie-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL.J. CORP. L.
33, 33 (1991); Stephen J. Redner, Thinking of Going Public? Think Twice, Then Read the Sarbanes-Oxley
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reexamination of corporate governance and reactionary legislation-the
Saxbanes-Oxley Act;121 it also created a shock in the D&O insurance
industry in that insurers reexamined their pricing behaviors.'22
E. D&O Insurance Coverage Obligations after SOX
Studies have examined the effect of legislative changes on the D&O
marketplace. For example, in a study of the impact of legislation before
SOX, Chalmers et al. (2002) provide evidence that D&O premiums
declined following both the introduction and enactment of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.12 These results suggest that
insurers updated the probability of D&O related claims downward
following the passage of this Act, which ultimately resulted in a reduction
in overall premiums. 124
Linck, Netter & Yang (2008) examine the effects of SOX on both the
supply of and the demand for directors and officers insurance. 125
result of Sarbanes-Oxley and increased shareholder litigation, "some of
the largest commercial insurance companies reduced their D&O coverage
obligations by increasing deductibles and lowering limits on overall
coverage," thus exposing directors to higher liability.12 6  As insurer
capacity deteriorated and insurers left the market, a large number of new
insurers emerged to offer D&O coverage to public companies.127 Because
demand rose between 2000 and 2003, more insurers entered the market,
causing D&O premiums to fall.'28 In addition, class actions against U.S.
Act of 2002, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 521, 529 (2002) ("The shock of the corporate scandals
involving formerly highly respected and revered executives and auditing firms has led to reactionary
legislation.").
121 Redner, supra note 120, at 529; Wilkins,supra note 112, at 340.
122 Past Towers Perrin D&O Liability surveys revealed that in 2001, 2002, and 2003, premiums for
D&O Liability insurance were increasing at an alarming rate. The Success Premium - DSO Insurance Coverage,
Practising Law Institute, 1 No. 24 PLI-CC 1 (July 26, 2004). Some insurance companies made D&O policies
more restrictive, and others dropped D&O coverage altogether. Id.
123 Chalmers, Dann & Harford, supra note 76, at 24.
124 Id.
125 James S. Linck, Jeffry M. Netter & Tina Yang, The Efects and Unintended Consequences of die
Sarbanes-OxicyAct on the Supply and Demand for Directors, 22 REV. FINAN. STUD. 3287,3288 (2008).
126 Fairfiax supra note 86, at 415.
127 See Mallon, supra note 103, at 20 (noting that Lloyd's of London virtually ceased providing D&O
insurance to public companies).
128 See Burgess, supra note 103, at 3.
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listed companies declined, resulting in reduced premiums.129 In a matter
of a few years,130 a post-scandal hard cycle quickly turned soft."'
A 2006 Towers Perrin Directors and Officers Liability Survey
reported a continuing soft market for D&O insurance. 3 2  "As a result,
survey participants generally reported higher limits, slightly lower
retentions and premiums, broader coverage, and fewer exclusions."133
Potential corporate directors became more interested in an organization's
D&O program and coverage.13 In 2006, premiums decreased by 6.5%,
and 31% of participants reported an increase in coverage enhancements."'
In addition, over 99% of public companies purchased D&O insurance. 3 1
The Survey also reported an increased interest in Side A of D&O
insurance that covers individual directors and officers when they are not
indemnified by their organization.' For public companies, 38% reported
purchasing such a policy."' Further, the Survey provided the following
data representing the types of D&O allegations from shareholder
claimants against public companies: accounting fraud 2%; breach of duty
129 Id.
130 Between 2004 and 2005, the D&O coverage standardized premium index indicated that coverage
costs decreased approximately 9% on average, illustrating the softening market TOWERS WATSON,
DIRECToRS AND OFFICERS LIABluw: 2005 SURVEYEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (Towers Perrin 2005), available
at http/www.towersperrin.conVtp/getwebcachedochvebc=TIL/USA200&20060I/DO2005_ExecSum.
pdf Among repeat participants of the 2005 Towers Perrin survey, the average premium reported was 8%
lower than the previous year. Id. at 2. The 2005 survey also reported that coverage restrictions were continuing
to ease with 25% of U.S. participants reporting that they had increased enhancements and 10% of participants
reporting that they had less exclusions. Id. at 4.
131 Despite the current soft cycle, demand for protection remains unabated. Id.
132 PERRIN SURVEY, supra note 52, at 7. The annual Towers Perrin D&O survey is based on a
nonrandom, self-selecting sample of companies. Id. at 9. It is also the only systematic source of information on
D&O insurance purchasing patterns in the U.S. Id.
133 Id. at 7.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.; Baker & Griffith, supra note 2, at 487, n.2.
137 See Sousa, supra note 50, at 379-80. Specifically, "Side A" Coverage provides liability coverage
directly to the officers and directors of a corporation for claims asserted against them for their wrongful acts,
errors, omissions, or breaches of duty. A-Side Coverage insures the corporate directors and officers in the
event that the corporation does not or cannot indemnify them under any applicable corporate documents or
laws. A-Side Coverage is significant because it protects directors and officers where the corporation is
financially unable to indemnify due to insolvency or bankruptcy, or is legally unable to indemnify due to
prohibitions under state corporation law or the corporation's own by-laws or articles of incorporation. Id. In
contrast, "Side B" coverage provides reimbursement to the corporation for amounts paid as indemnification to
its directors and officers, and "Side C" coverage, also known as entity coverage, protects the company itself
against various claims made directly against it Falladori, supra note 55.
138 See Perrin Survey, supra note 52.
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to minority shareholders 4%; dishonest/fraud 3%; general breach of
fiduciary duty 12%; inadequate disclosure including financial reporting
37%; and stock and other public offering 19%. The 2009 Towers Perrin'"
report on D&O Liability Insurance indicated that like 2007, the 2008
results continued to show a soft insurance market for D&O liability
insurance.'" The literature supports these figures. For example, Froot &
O'Connell propose the theory of probability updating, whereby demand
for insurance shifts considerably when insureds significantly increase their
assessment of the real or perceived likelihood of loss.14' Similarly, Lai et al.
argue that insurers may also experience a change in expectation about
future losses or expenses that will impact price and/or supply of
coverage.142
F. The Latest "Shock"
While the dust continues to settle from the corporate scandals at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, the U.S. is in the midst of another
perceived loss shock that is likely to impact the D&O liability insurance
marketplace. The following chart illustrates how the marketplace has
changed over time indicating that we are in a period of uncertainty:
139 Towers Perrin merged with Watson Wyatt Worldwide in 209 and is now called Towers Watson.
14 TowERS WATSON, DiRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILlY: 2008 SURVEY OF INSURANCE
PURCHASING TRENDS (2009), httpV/www.towerswatson.coi/assets/pdQ2791/2791.pdf Premiums
continued to decrease during 2008, although not as much as seen in 2007. Id. at 5. Repeat participants
reported an average decline in premiums of 5%, a 21% decline in average retention, and a 6% increase in
average limits. Id. Coverage enhancements were down from the prior year, and only 3% of respondents
reported a decrease in policy exclusions, down from 34% in 2007. Id. at 6. Furthermore, the Towers Watson
premium index was down by 14%. Id. Also noteworthy was the change in A-Side coverage purchasing. The
2008 survey indicated a 33% increase in purchases for A-Side coverage among repeat public company
participants-43% of public companies purchased A- Side only coverage which was 179 participants. Id. at 5.
15% of organizations with assets over $10 billion, or 4 out of 15 participants, only purchased A-Side coverage.
"Some industry observers have commented that many large financial institutions facing potential large D&O
claims from the current financial crisis only purchase Side A coverage." Id.
141 See Kenneth Froot & Paul O'Connell, The Pricing of U.S. Catastrophe Reinsurance 7-8, (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 60443, 1997).
142 Gene C. Lai et al., Great (and Not So Great) Expectations: An Endogenous Economic Explication
ofInsurance Cycles and Liability Crises, 67J. RISK& INs. 617, 620 (2000).
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Years Period Characteristics
1991-2000 Benchmark Period of Relative Certainty and Lack of Scandals
2001-2003 Corporate Scandals/Uncertainty
2003 Implementation of SOX
2004-2006 Post-SOX Relative Certainty
2007 New Period of Uncertainty
2012 Financial Crisis and Uncertainty
To fully understand the recent effects to the marketplace, this period
of uncertainty is best analyzed on an industry level. To date, no studies
have examined the ability/tendency of insurers to adjust the price and
availability of D&O insurance coverage across industries. Fier, et al.
derived a model which divides the marketplace into two groups in order
to better understand the shift in the market."3  The first group
("impacted") consists of those industries most associated with the scandals
(and presumably weak governance) that occurred during 2001 and 2002,
while the second group ("non-impacted") consists of those industries that
were not typically associated with the corporate scandals. This allows
tracking of not only the overall marketplace, but the key industries closely
related to the corporate governance failures.'
The analysis of the D&O market on an industry level suggests that
scandal-based events are unique loss shocks that directly impact the
demand for D&O insurance. insurers pricing behavior. The analyses
produced evidence of a new type of probability updating in the demand
for D&O insurance, as those industries most associated with the corporate
scandals of the early 2000s typically carried greater levels of insurance
coverage during periods characterized by greater uncertainty. More
specifically, the results suggest that during periods of uncertainty (i.e.,
2001 to 2002 and 2007 to 2008) industries most associated with corporate
scandals and a lack of corporate governance generally purchased greater
levels of D&O insurance than those industries less associated with these
14 Fier, et al., supra note 5, at 13.
144 Id. at 5, 13-14.
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events, but a statistical difference does not exist with respect to insurance
demand during periods of calm or certainty.'45 Overall, the findings
suggest that the shocks resulting from the corporate scandals and
enactment of SOX provided a distinct type of loss shock that impacted the
various industry segments of the D&O marketplace differently.
IV. WHAT EFFECT DOEs D&O LIABILITY HAVE ON DETERRENCE
TODAY?
Past and present scandals have affected D&O liability and the
availability of coverage for such claims. Increased shareholder class action
lawsuits, high damage awards in those lawsuits, and claims related to the
restatement of earnings have had strong impacts on carriers. Nonetheless,
the D&O market has softened faster than many would have expected,
driving coverage for claims up and the cost for coverage down.
These factors seem to have created a more traditional soft market
response with D&O insurance - lower premiums and increased access to
coverage. Fundamental changes in liability law, however, do not appear
forthcoming. On the contrary, a lack of successful prosecutions under
Sarbanes-Oxley and the resulting regulations seems, in and of itself, to
have alleviated much anxiety over the risk that directors and officers may
bear. But, the current credit crisis may revive that anxiety.
In the wake of the current credit crisis, we are potentially in the midst
of yet another shock. In 2008, despite an increase of dismissals, courts
began approving increasingly higher monetary values in securities class
action settlements.146 In 2009, securities class action settlements
amounted to $3.8 billion, compared to $2.7 billion in 2008,
"represent[ing] more than a 35 percent increase" in the total value of
settlements. An average settlement of $37 million in 2009
demonstrated that courts were serious about enforcement and
deterrence.148 These high value settlements may provide hard-hitting
14s Periods of relative certainty and uncertainty are defined as discussed in the chart provided above.
146 Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2010 Mid-Year Aessment 2 (2010),
http/ww.comerstone.com/fdles/Publicatio/a4e3e805-e0c7-4c6f-9flc-
3cee924a6bl9/Presentation/PublicationAttachmenV28990788-04f9-4ffd-938f-
419be91146b6tComerstoneResearchFilings_2010 Mid Year Assessment.pdf (stating 2009 total settlement
dollars were "more than 35 percent higher" than 2008).
1 Id.
us Id. at 2. The financial crisis produced three of the largest settlements of this decade: World Con,
Inc. ($6.2 billion), Enron Corp. ($72 billion), and Tyco International ($3.2 billion). Although 2009
settlements did not reach the previous billion dollar range, the settlement amounts came dangerously close
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deterrence if D&O insurance is not high enough to cover the settlement
and out of pocket liability becomes a reality for directors and officers. 149
Conversely, if D&O insurance coverage surpasses the settlement amount,
D&O liability may not create significant deterrence.15 0 Even if these high
settlement amounts do not result in deterrence, securities class actions are
often filed with companion shareholder derivative actions which result in
mandatory changes to corporate governance practices and therefore have
the ability to substantially alter the behavior of directors and officers.s15
Recent cases provide further insights into the current state of affairs
for D&O liability. In 2009, the Delaware Chancery Court considered two
important cases regarding directors' and officers' oversight liability.152
These decisions reinforce the high burden of proof plaintiffs must meet in
overcoming the Business Judgment Rule, but also warn that a showing of
bad faith and intentional misconduct may be enough to find directors
liable for corporate losses. The Delaware court also hints at a significant
new development that could hold directors and officers involved in prior
financial scandals to a higher standard of care with regard to their duties to
shareholders.
A. In re American International Group, Inc. Consolidated Derivative
Litigation
The Delaware Chancery Court considered oversight liability in the
recent case, In re American International Group, Inc. Consolidated Derivative
Litigation." Shareholders of American International Group, Inc. (AIG)
when courts approved settlements up to $925,500,000. I at 18 n.2.
" Bernard Black et al., Outside Dieor Liabilty, 58 STAN L REv. 1055, 1061 (2006) (explaining out-
of-pocket hability may arise ifa company lacks D&O insurance or carries "insufficient coverage").
'5 Id. Between 1980 and 2006, "only thirteen cases resulted in outside directors paying out-of-pocket
for damages, settlement, or their own legal expenses." Id. at 1064.
151 Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2009 Review and Analysis 11 (2009),
httpV/www.cornerstone.con7/files/News/5412f893-24de-4del-8be7-
15af788del6a/Presentatior/NewsAttachment/fc277c05-a487-42c8-8e4b-
76ef2dea0615/CornerstoneResearchSetlements_2009 Analysis.pdf (stating "slightly more than 45 percent
of cases settled in 2009 were accompanied by a derivative action filing"); see also Jessica Erickson, Corporate
Misonduct and the Pefat Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L REV. 75, 90,91 (discussing the
myriad of securities class actions and derivative suits that Merrill Lynch faced which were based upon
'strikingly similar" complaints); see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949)
(explaining that a derivative suit was "long the chief regulator of corporate management.").
152 See In re Am. Int'l Grp., Inc. ConsoL Derivative Litig., 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re
Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
153 In re Am. Int'l Group, Inc. Consol. Derivative Litig., 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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brought a derivative suit against former directors and officers of the
company'" alleging that intentional misconduct by several of AIG's top
officers resulted in materially misleading financial statements which
overstated the value of the corporation by billions of dollars.' The
misstatements led to $1.6 billion in fines and penalties, $440 million in
settlement payments, $800 million in lost profits and penalties, and a $3.5
billion "hit" to shareholders' equity.'
The court found that at least two of the defendants knew and
approved of much of the financial wrongdoing occurring in the company,
and had thus had breached their duty of loyalty by knowingly failing to
monitor internal controls.' In essence, this decision demonstrates the
ongoing need for deterrence and for D&O insurance to support, rather
than undermine, that deterrence.
B. In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation
The Delaware Chancery Court considered oversight liability in a
second case, In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, but with
a different result.' Citigroup shareholders brought a derivative action
against current and former directors and officers seeking to recover for
losses sustained from exposure to the subprime lending market.'
The plaintiffs brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty and waste.
First, under a breach of fiduciary claim, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants were liable for oversight liability because they failed to
monitor Citigroup's business risk and its exposure to the subprime
mortgage lending market." Further, the plaintiffs claimed the directors
and officers should have been put on notice of the struggling economic
market by "red flags," including newspaper articles stating the housing
market bubble was about to burst and increased bankruptcy filings by
mortgage companies and hedge funds.''
154 Id. at 774.
155 Id.
t56 Dominick T. Gattuso & Vernon R Proctor, Reining in Dnator and Oficers in Coporate Americ, 19
Bus. LAWTODAY46 (2010).
1s In reAm. Int'l Group, Inc. ConsoL Derivaive Lig., 965 A2d at 799; Gattuso & Proctor, supra note
156, at 46.
158 In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
159 Id. at 111.
160 Id. at 123.
161 Id. at 115, 124.
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The court analyzed the breach of fiduciary duty claims under the
business judgment rule, with a "focus on the decision making process
rather than on a substantive evaluation of the merits of the decision."16 2
The court dismissed the claims, holding the plaintiffs' conclusory claims
did not show the directors failed to meet their oversight obligations." In
contrast to the AIG's directors' failure to oversee or correct fraudulent
conduct in the previous case, the Citigroup directors' failure to take notice
of the "red flags," constituted, at most, evidence that the directors had
made a bad business decision to invest in the subprime mortgage
market. "
The plaintiffs argued that nine of the directors, who had been
involved with the Enron financial scandal, should have been "especially
sensitive" to the "red flags."' The court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to
hold these directors to a higher standard of liability because the plaintiffs
failed to show how the Enron scandal was relevant to the Citigroup
subprime mortgage losses.'66
The plaintiffs cited McCall v. Scott"' as support for their position. 68 In
the McCall case, the Sixth Circuit held that a "significant factor" in its
decision that the plaintiffs facts created a reasonable doubt as to the
directors' disinterestedness was the director's involvement in prior
instances of the same type of questionable billing procedures.16 9  In
contrast, the plaintiffs in In re Citigroup did not show there were any
specific similarities between the directors' involvement in the Enron
scandal and Citigroup's losses.170 The court alluded, however, that there
may be situations where directors would be held to a higher standard due
to their exposure to previous scandals.
The court also considered the plaintiffs' corporate waste claims,
dismissing all but one of the waste claims. In an unusual move for the
162 Id. at 124.
' Id. at 126.
164 Id. at 128; see also Gregory V. Varallo & Margot F. Alicks, Recent Deveopinents in Delaware Corporate
Law, 1774 PLI/Corp 83,156-58 (2009).
165 In re Citrmp Inc Slolder Derivative Litig., 964 A2d at 129.
166 Id.
167 McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001).
16s In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d at 129.
169 Id.; McCall, 239 F.3d at 819-824.
170 In re Cigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Lig., 964 A2d at 129 ("Plaintiffs have not shown how
involvement with the Enron related scandals should have in any way put the director defendants on a
heightened alert to problems in the subprime mortgage market. Additionally, the use of SIVs in the Enron
related conduct would not serve to put the director defendants on any type of heightened notice to the
unrelated use of SIVs in structuring transactions involving subprime securities.").
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historically pro-business tribunal, the court held the plaintiffs' allegations
regarding a large severance package for retiring CEO Charles Prince, who
was at least partially to blame for the billions of dollars lost at Citigroup,
raised a reasonable doubt as whether the package was so "one-sided" and
so disproportionately large and unconscionable as to be considered
waste."' The Delaware Chancery Court recognized that there is an
"outer limit" to the discretion of directors in setting executive
compensation-at some point the compensation is so disproportionately
large as compared to the executive's contribution that it constitutes waste.
Following the recent AIG and Citigroup cases, the general principle
remains that the business judgment rule protects decisions by the board of
directors. In addition, to prove a claim that directors and officer have
violated their oversight duties, plaintiffs must allege more than mere "red
flags" that should have swayed the directors' decision making. 2 Instead,
plaintiffs must show that directors acted in bad faith, knowingly shirking
their duties."' It is yet to be seen whether plaintiffs will be able to hold
directors with prior exposure to financial scandals to a higher standard, as
alluded in to the In re Citigroup case. What impact do these cases have on
the D&O insurance market-what is the deterrent effect?
C. Bear Sterns
In the summer of 2007, several hedge funds, heavily invested in
mortgage securities and managed by Bear Steams, collapsed as the
financial crisis loomed on the horizon. As a result of the collapse,
investors lost 1.6 billion dollars. "The fiasco presaged the financial
turmoil that would later upend Wall Street and the broader economy."174
Cioffio and Tannin, hedge fund managers at Bear Stearns, were arrested
in June 2008, after being accused of lying to investors about the
"precarious state of the funds they oversaw.", The case filed by the New
York District Attorney turned on emails between Cioffi and Tannin and
their investors in the fund, assuring the investors that their investments
were sound.17 1 Prosecutors argued that Cioffi and Tannin committed
171 Id. at 138.
172 Id. at 128; Varallo & Alicks, supra note 164, at 156-58.
173 See In re Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 799 (DeL Ch. 2009).
174 Zachery Kouwe and Dan Slater, 2 Bear Sams Fund Iaders Are Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2009, at Al.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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fraud because they were aware that the fund was "anything but sound.""
On November 2, 2009, the United States Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of New York acquitted Ralph R. Cioffi and Matthew M.
Tannin, hedge fund managers from Bear Stearns, of securities fraud.178 As
one of the jurors explained, "There was a reasonable doubt on every
charge. We just didn't feel that the case had been proven."17 1 Cioffi and
Tannin still face civil action by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
but are not criminally liable for fraud.'"
D. MF Global Holdings Ltd.
More recently, in December 2011, regulators commenced an
investigation into whether MF Global Holdings Ltd. intentionally used
customer funds to cover the bankrupt firm's margin payments on
European government bond trades. The Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Justice Department, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and the bankruptcy trustee have been reviewing the
brokerage's accounts seeking proof of fraud, which would allow them to
recover some of the lost $1.2 billion.'8 ' MF Global filed the eighth-largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history on October 31, 2011 after investors lost
confidence in the capital position of the firm and demanded their
money.18 According to an e-mail that rating agency Standard & Poor's
provided to the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations, the Chief Financial Officer of MF Global, Henri
Steenkamp, told Standard & Poor's that the company had "never been
stronger" just a week before the collapse of the company."
On December 8, 2011, a trading firm led by the vice-chairman of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange filed suit against MF Global's Chief
Executive Officer at the time of its collapse, former U.S. Senator and
New Jersey Governor, Jon Corzine, alleging that he violated laws that
prohibited using customer money to fund trading activities, a practice that
177 Id.
178 United States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
1 Zachery Kouwe and Dan Slater, 2 Bear Steams Fund Leaders Are Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
11, 2009, at Al.
180 Id.
1s1 Jim Spencer, MF Global ue ripple into heartland, STAR TIUBUNE, December Z 2011, at 1D.
182 Zeke Faux & Phil Mattingly, MF Global Told S&P "Never Been Stronger" as failure loomed,
BLOOMBERG Bus. WK, January 30, 2012, http//www.businesswek.con/news/2012-01-30/mf-global-
told-s-p-never-been-stronger-as-failure-loomed.html.
183 Id.
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allegedly led to the disappearance of the over $1.2 billion in customer
funds. " Six other traders are listed as plaintiffs in the lawsuit and they are
seeking class action status."' This lawsuit is among a "variety of litigation"
against F Global's former officers and directors that is expected to result
from the firm's bankruptcy.'"
CONCLUSION
As more scandal emerges that shocks the D&O insurance marketplace
and both lawmakers and investors demand more accountability, directors
and officers will seek to transfer the risk of liability rather than bear that
risk personally.'8 Transferring risk in such an environment, however, has
the potential to create a scenario where the existence of insurance alters
the incentive to minimize wrongdoing.'" In fact, when an insured knows
that the insurance will cover any harm caused, the probability of loss
actually increases, thereby undermining the deterrent effect.'89
With D&O liability, increased risk transference in a soft market has
the potential to increase loss probability. Increased loss probability is
particularly troubling considering that we are arguably inside of another
shock - on the contrary, deterrence seems to be of the highest
importance. As a result, it remains critical that the marketplace continues
selective underwriting so that risk transference supports, rather than
undermines, the deterrent effect of D&O liability.
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